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5ABSTRACT
The main goal of this paper is to explain the rise of competitive
authoritarianism in Erdoğan’s Turkey. The recent literature has
mainly focused on the taxonomical debate about the type of
regime established by Erdoğan, dealing only rarely with the factors
10explaining the Turkish autocratization. Building on Levitsky and
Loxton’s framework, which underlines the catalyst role played by
the election of populist leaders for the rise of competitive author-
itarianism in Latin America, the analysis identifies the interactions
among Erdoğan’s populism and threats and opportunities pro-
15vided by both domestic and international environments as the








The aim of this paper is to investigate the Turkish autocratization under the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) governments. According to the
20V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index, Turkey has been a stable low-quality electoral
democracy during the 2000s, worsening its score since 2005 and falling below the
democratic threshold in 2014 (Figure 1). The recent literature has engaged in
a fervent debate about the type of regime established by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, dealing
only rarely with the factors explaining this regime change (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016;
25Konak and Özgür Dönmez 2015; Taş 2015). Hence, what kind of authoritarian shift or
democratic reversal is Turkey experiencing? Which factors may explain the Turkish
autocratization? I deal with the first question sharing Esen and Gümüşçü’ findings
(2016), according to which Turkey transitioned from a tutelary democracy to compe-
titive authoritarianism (CA) since 2010. The second research question, which represents
30the core of this study, will be addressed applying to Turkey Levitsky and Loxton (2013)
framework on the catalyst role played by populism for the rise of CA in Latin America.
Hence, I claim that to explain the Turkish descent into competitive authoritarianism we
have to focus on Erdoğan’s populism and, above all, its interactions with the domestic
and international environments in which he operated.
35According to Levitsky and Loxton (2013), the literature addresses the negative
impact of populism on democracy, but the causal mechanisms linking this phenom-
enon to autocratization remain poorly understood. Selecting the Turkish case, I will
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enrich Levitsky and Loxton’s theoretical contribution testing the capacity of their
framework to travel beyond Latin America and explain cases characterized by different
40conditions (tutelary democracy, relevant role of international factors, etc.). Moreover,
this case selection is justified also by the intrinsic relevance of the Turkish case, which
may provide crucial information on many sub-fields of research within the democra-
tization theory (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016). For example, being a mid-level income
country Turkey represents a critical challenge to the modernization theory, according to
45which democracies with a non-oil GDP per capita exceeding $8043 have never shifted
into authoritarianism (Brownlee 2016). It also represents a crucial case in the emerging
literature on democratic backsliding caused by elected leaders (Bermeo 2016).
Moreover, it provides relevant information on the emergence and durability of hybrid
regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010). Furthermore, being subjected to the EU condition-
50ality, the Turkish autocratization challenges the role played by international actors in
democratization processes. Finally, Erdoğan’s case can be interpreted through the lens
of the global phenomenon represented of populism (Yabanci 2016).
The paper is divided into seven sections. After the introduction, the literature on
Turkish autocratization will be overviewed. Then, I present the framework connecting
55populism and competetive authoritarianism. In the fourth section, Erdoğan is classified
as a ‘movement populist’. An analysis of the processes and causal mechanisms through
which he confronted tutelary institutions, taking control of the Turkish state, and
triggering the rise of competitive authoritarianism is provided in the fifth section.
The last empirical section describes, briefly, the maturation of CA in Turkey.
60I conclude with the major findings of this research.
Erdoğan and the Turkish autocratization: an overview of the literature
Since 2002, the literature has widely analyzed Erdoğan’s impact on Turkish politics.
While some democratic improvements have been initially credited to the AKP (Tuğal
2009), growing concerns about a democratic erosion have emerged since
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Figure 1. V-DEM electoral democracy index, Turkey 2000–2017.
Source: www.v-dem.net.
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in a taxonomical debate regarding the type of regime established in Turkey, focusing
only rarely on the factors explaining this regime change. Hence, several scholars have
applied concepts such as illiberal democracy (Bechev 2014; Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2015),
delegative democracy (Özbudun 2014; Taş 2015), electoral authoritarian (Konak and
70Özgür Dönmez 2015), and competitive authoritarianism (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016;
Özbudun 2015). This literature can be clustered into two groups, with one of them still
considering Turkey as a diminished form of democracy and the other preferring to opt
for sub-categories of authoritarianism. Here, I side with the latter. The V-DEM
Electoral Democracy Index, which shows Turkey falling below the democracy threshold
75(0.5) in 2014, confirms this claim (Figure 1).
Moreover, I share Esen and Gümüşçü’ conclusions (2016), according to which
competitive authoritarianism is better equipped to describe the features of Erdoğan’s
regime respect to any other type of political system. The Authors claim that Turkey
transitioned from tutelary democracy to CA since 2010: the end of tutelary democracy
80in the same period is confirmed by several Turkish scholars (Gürsoy 2012; Kuru 2012;
Taş 2015; Yildiz 2014). Then, through a brilliant analysis of the key competitive
authoritarian dimensions (elections, civil liberties, and the playing field), they find an
almost perfect match between CA and Erdoğan’s Turkey. However, as much of the
literature on Turkish autocratization, Esen and Gümüşçü have privileged in this article
85the taxonomical debate about the regime installed by Erdoğan respect to the factors
explaining the regime change.
On this regard, the literature proposes very few hypotheses. According to one of
them, the emergence of the AKP as a predominant party led the party leadership to
adopt a majoritarian interpretation of democracy. In turn, this led to a growing con-
90centration of power and the progressive elimination of checks over it (Gümüşçü 2013-
; Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012). However, electoral hegemony cannot explain by
itself autocratization: cases like Japan show that democracy may coexist with
a predominant party. Moreover, as stressed by Özbudun (2006) the majoritarian
interpretation of democracy was already present in the Welfare party (WP) and others
95AKP predecessors. Another hypothesis focuses on the existential insecurity of the AKP
elite, triggered by the secularist interference in the 2007 presidential elections and the
attempt to ban the AKP in 2008. Those events led Erdoğan to adopt a tougher line
against oppositions to avoid similar existentialist threats in the future (Öniş 2013).
However, focusing just on some key events would miss to evaluate the prolonged
100process that led to the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. Yet another
thesis focuses on the learning processes of the AKP leadership, which adopted an
authoritarian mode of governance similar to that of Kemalists (Keyman and
Gümüşçü 2014; Somer 2016). Although there are important similarities between the
Kemalist and the AKP modes of governance, this explanation underestimates the
105crucial innovations introduced by the ruling party since the 2000s. Finally, in a very
recent article that explores processes and mechanisms through which the AKP managed
to build a pro-government business class, Esen and Gümüşçü (2018) suggest that the
AKP-business relations may represent the driving force behind the rise of CA in
Turkey. However, this thesis risks to consider as a cause what should be more appro-
110priately evaluated as a means. In fact, both the Levitsky and Way’s framework (2010)
and the very same analysis conducted by Esen and Gümüşçü underline the instrumental
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nature of the incumbent’s favourable treatment of specific business sectors and actors,
which were required to pay back the ruling party both during electoral campaigns and
in inter-electoral periods. Hence, the competitive authoritarian regime has not been
115built for enriching and protecting a specific business class, as an oversemplification of
Esen and Gümüşçü’s thesis would lead to think. On the contrary, these Authors
demonstrate that the establishment of a pro-government business block represented
an effective tool for preserving political power and assuring the regime’s survival. In
conclusion, the political dimension appears to be dominant in the Turkish case, and it
120is in this dimension that we need to look for an explanation of the rise of competitive
authoritarianism in Turkey.
Hence, which factors may explain the Turkish autocratization? My claim is that we
have to focus on the peculiar interactions among Erdoğan’s populism and the domestic
and international environments in which he operated.
125Populism and competitive authoritarianism
To explore the relationship between populism and CA, I build upon Levitsky and
Loxton’s study on Latin America (2013), where they demonstrate how populism may
represent a catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. The adoption of
this framework is justified by the similarities among Turkey and Latin American cases,
130which are highlighted by an increasing body of literature that compares Erdoğan’s
populism with South American cases (Aytaç and Öniş 2014; Selçuk 2016; Yabanci
2016). However, while these studies are valuable to understand Erdoğan’s leadership
style, they do not address the connections between populism and the Turkish auto-
cratization, which give us the chance to test on Turkey the explicative capacity of
135a framework that does exactly that for the same Latin American countries.
Levitsky and Loxton (2013) compare 14 presidents elected in four Latin American
cases (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) between 1990 and 2010. They start their
analysis evaluating first other variables that may trigger autocratization processes.
Economic crises, mineral rents, economic statism, institutional and democratic fragility
140and party system weaknesses are all factors that may favour a transition from weak
democracies to hybrid or authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). In fact,
these factors stimulate the concentration of power in the executive by weakening social,
institutional and political checks over it. However, according to Levitsky and Loxton
none of these variables can explain alone the rise of competitive authoritarianisms
145because of the excessive number of exceptions: for example, CAs in Bolivia and Ecuador
emerged in phases of robust economic growth, Peru became a competitive authoritarian
regime before the 2000s mineral boom, the level of statism was more or less constant
for all the cases considered, etc. Hence, Levitsky and Loxton’s hypothesis is that to
explain transitions from weak democracies to CAs other factors must be considered: in
150Latin American cases this factor is populism (Levitsky and Loxton 2013).
Building on Barr’s definition (2009), Levitsky and Loxton identify three characteristics
of populism.1 First, populists use anti-establishment appeal to garner popular support,
positioning themselves in opposition to the entire elite. Second, populists are outsiders,
emerging from outside the national party system. Here a caveat is added: ‘politicians cease
155to be outsiders if they have governed previously, served as long-term cabinet ministers, or
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participated in national elections for 10 years or more’ (Levitsky and Loxton 2013, 115).
Third, populists overcome mediating institutions, like political parties, creating
a personalistic linkage with the people. According to Levitsky and Loxton, to have full
populism all three characteristics are needed. However, specific sub-types of populism can
160be detected in cases that possess the anti-establishment appeal, evaluated as the only
necessary condition, and one but not both of the other features. Hence, an insider who
rely on an anti-establishment appeal and a personalistic linkage is identified as a maverick
populist. Alternatively, an outsider who combine the necessary condition with a linkage
based on the intermediation of a strong grassroots movement (i.e. Evo Morales) is
165classified as a movement populist (Levitsky and Loxton 2013).
Despite favouring the inclusion ofmarginalized groups into the political process, populism
may stimulate the transition from a weak democracy to competitive authoritarianism for
three main reasons (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). First, due to their outsider status, populists
lack skills as negotiation and coalition building, which are acquired spending years working
170within institutions typical of democracy (i.e. parliaments); moreover, this lack of experience
within democratic institutions lead to a weak commitment on the part of populists to
preserve those institutions and to pursue their goals through democratic procedures.
Second, populist campaigns establish an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide, where the ‘them’
consists of both the old elite, pictured as corrupt and detached from reality, and the
175state institutions controlled by that elite. Hence, in their campaigns populists often
promise to establish a ‘real’ democracy, ousting old elites and reforming their institu-
tions. Consequently, when populists win elections through an anti-establishment
appeal, they earn an electoral mandate to bury the existing elite and its institutions,
which cannot be dismantled without threatening the democratic nature of the regime.
180Third, once in power populists are confronted by hostile institutions of horizontal
accountability still controlled by the old elite. Since populists won elections on the
ground of an anti-establishment appeal, in order to fulfil their promises they are
incentivized to assault existing democratic institutions, trying to close legislatures,
colonizing judiciaries or changing the constitution.
185The election of a populist will trigger a constitutional crisis, faced by populists through
plebiscitary strategies like referenda, crowded mass rallies, call for early elections for
either a new parliament or a constitutional assembly, etc. If populists prevail, they gain an
unchecked control over state institutions through radical changes in the constitutions,
mass purges and the appointment of loyalists to key public positions. This control of the
190state apparatus allows populists to skew the playing field against opponents, favouring the
rise of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Loxton 2013).
According to Levitsky and Loxton, CA is more probable with full populists, while
maverick populists are the least dangerous. In cases of movement populists, account-
ability mechanisms to strong grassroots movements may prevent an excessive concen-
195tration of power. However, they will act as full populists if those movements are
themselves anti-establishment.
Finally, the authors stress that populism represents only a proximate cause of
competitive authoritarianism, while other factors may also be relevant. However, they
claim that only a combination of those conditions with the election of a populist may
200trigger a transition to CA. Hence, populism represents a catalyst that, with other factors
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acting as facilitating conditions and through the mechanisms described above, may
explain the rise of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Loxton 2013).
Levitsky and Loxton do not consider their study as a definitive test of their frame-
work; however, it allows them to show the causal mechanisms at work and provides
205some initial support for the theory. Hence, some relevant theoretical questions may
arise: can this framework travel and explain cases in other regions of the world? How it
interacts with conditions absent in Latin American cases? The peculiarities of the
Turkish case enrich the original framework providing a possible answer to these
questions. For example, international factors (i.e. EU conditionality) played
210a prominent role in Turkey but were marginal in Latin America: how does Levitsky
and Loxton’s framework interacts with these factors? Moreover, respect to Latin
American cases, the Turkish establishment included autonomous institutional actors
with full control of the legal means of coercion (i.e. military) and a recent history of
direct intervention in politics: can Levitsky and Loxton’s framework be applied in cases
215of tutelary democracy? Finally, is this framework applicable to countries where religion
represents a relevant issue?
Although the research strategy is centred on a structured and focused case study
(George and Bennett 2005), Latin American cases will constitute a constant point of
reference and comparison. This investigation will follow the structure adopted by
220Levitsky and Loxton to examine each of their 14 cases. First, I classify Erdoğan as
a populist. Then, I explore the processes through which the populist mechanisms,
interacting with other factors, allowed him to acquire full control of state institutions.
Finally, I describe how Erdoğan has employed those institutions against opponents,
skewing the playing field and triggering the emergence of competitive authoritarianism.
225Before starting the empirical analysis, I need to stress that this investigation will be
mostly centred on the pre-2010 phase. To justify this choice two factors related to
Levitsky and Way’s CA framework are worth mentioning: first, a competitive author-
itarian regime cannot exist if the authority of elected officials is restricted by unelected
tutelary powers; second, the presence of just one of the indicators elaborated for each
230competitive authoritarian dimension (elections, civil liberties, the playing field) is
sufficient to score a case as CA (Levitsky and Way 2010). On this ground, the end of
tutelary democracy in 2010 was a necessary conditions to classify Turkey as
a competitive authoritarianism, despite Esen and Gümüşçü’s analysis demonstrated
that some of those indicators were present even before 2010 (Esen and Gümüşçü
2352016). Therefore, once tutelary democracy ended a CA regime emerged in Turkey,
although in an immature and incomplete form, which then fully consolidated during
Erdoğan’s third term in office. However, if the goal is to explain the rise of competitive
authoritarianism in Turkey rather than describing it in its mature form, the analysis has
to focus primarily on factors and processes belonging to the pre-2010 phase.
240Erdoğan as a peculiar movement populist
To comprehend Erdoğan’s populism and its impact on Turkey, it is crucial to underline
first the peculiarities of this case. Unlike Latin American cases, Turkey presented a dual
power structure where tutelary veto-players exerted a relevant influence over elected
governments. In particular, the military staged several coups since the 1960s,
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245accumulating important privileges and veto powers through constitutional and legal
regulations (Yildiz 2014). Other important veto-players were the judiciary, with the
constitutional court closing Islamist parties several times, and the presidency of the
republic. According to Mardin (1973), Turkish politics is built around a strong centre,
represented by the state bureaucracy and the military, which are imbued with Kemalist
250principles. This centre is confronted by a hostile periphery, including the peasantry,
small farmers and artisans, and is based on a heterogeneous set of regional, religious
and ethnic groups and political interests. The rise of Erdoğan represents the last
challenge of these peripheries to the Kemalist state. In fact, the AKP is the last
representative of a chain of Islamist parties closed by the constitutional court or the
255military since the 1970s, as the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party and
the WP. After the closure of WP’s successor, the Virtue party, in 2001, the reformist
wing of the Islamist movement established the AKP under Erdoğan’s leadership
(Özbudun 2006).
Anti-establishment tendencies characterized all AKP predecessors. For example, in the
2601995 WP electoral platform the Turkish system was described as a ‘fraud’, a ‘guided democ-
racy’, and the promise to establish a ‘real pluralistic democracy’, with a greater role for
referenda and popular councils, was officially included. Social justice, honest government and
the restoration of Turkey’s former grandeur were emphasized. While respecting the role of
elections as the only route to political power, WP’s idea of democracy was more majoritarian
265than liberal or pluralistic. In fact, democracy represented themeans to reach the real goal, that
‘order of happiness’ constituting a reference to the Islamic routes of the party. While WP’
claims regarding the establishment of an Islamic state based on Sharia were vague, its
promises to enhance freedom of conscience, implying the right to live according to one’s
beliefs, constituted a source of conflicts with the establishment. On the economy, an Islamic-
270inspired ‘just order’, that would have implied heavy state control, was promoted. On foreign
policy, the WP was thirdworldist, advocating closer relations with Islamic countries, anti-
American and clearly opposed to the EU accession process (Özbudun 2006).
Events like the 1997 ‘post-modern coup’, the closure of the WP by the constitu-
tional court in 1998 or, perhaps even more, Erdoğan’s personal experience,2 had
275a crucial impact on his choices, convincing him to confront tutelary institutions via
more pragmatic strategies (Selçuk 2016) and, hence, leading to a partial karstification
of his anti-establishment appeal. In fact, if in 1993 Erdoğan could say that ‘there is
no room for Kemalism or any other official ideology in Turkey’s future’ and
democracy is ‘a vehicle which you ride as far as you want to go and then get off’,
280(Jenkins 2008, 166) in 2001 Erdoğan and AKP’ positions became more moderate.
The AKP leadership defined itself as conservative democrats, although Islamist
origins were not officially repudiated. Moreover, it formally abandoned the WP
ideological combativeness, adopting a different programmatic platform. For example,
it refrained from launching populist attacks against the establishment and pledged to
285respect secularist principles in religious affairs (Özbudun 2006). On the economy, it
embraced neo-liberalism, while on foreign policy it was pro-USA and supported the
EU accession process (Dinçşahin 2012).
However, Erdoğan’s anti-establishment appeal did not disappear, also because of the
propitious situation generated by a severe economic crisis. According to the V-DEM
290GDP Growth Index in 1999 and 2001 the GDP suffered a decline of 4.94% and 7.18%,
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respectively. This economic crisis represented a crucial facilitating condition for
Erdoğan’s rise to power, since it led people to lose faith in mainstream political parties:
none of the six parties present in parliament passed the 10% electoral threshold in the
2002 elections (Çarkoğlu 2002). Hence, thanks to the economic crisis and the loss of
295credibility suffered by traditional political parties, during the 2002 campaign Erdoğan
could effectively resort to an anti-establishment appeal. He contrasted ‘the people’ and
‘the elite’ in his rallies, presenting himself as a ‘man of the people’, a ‘black Turk’,
referring to his poor socio-economic background and claiming to represent all the
disadvantaged groups identified as ‘the periphery’ (Çinar and Sayin 2014). The use of
300these kind of narratives as legitimation tools is common not only in the LA cases
analyzed by Levitsky and Loxton (2013), but also in other EU candidate countries like
Macedonia and Serbia (Günay and Dzihic 2016; Yabanci and Taleski 2018). These anti-
establishment stances in the Turkish case are exemplified by the following quotation
from an Erdoğan’s rally:
305My story is the story of this people. Either the people will win and come to power, or the
pretentious and oppressive minority – estranged from the reality of Anatolia and looking
over it with disdain – will remain in power. The authority to decide on this belongs to the
people. Enough is enough, sovereignty belongs to the people!3
As confirmed by Aytaç and Öniş (2014), respect to the national party system and the
310secularist establishment, Erdoğan was an outsider. During the 1990s, he was not part of
the mainstream political community, although in 1995 he became mayor of Istanbul.
Moreover, in 1998–1999, Erdoğan’s imprisonment for reciting a poem with militant
Islamist tones reinforced his outsider status: because of this sentence, he was tempora-
rily banned from politics (Aytaç and Öniş 2014). This political experience can be
315compared to that of Morales or Correa: the former was elected to Congress in 1997
and participated in 2002 presidential elections before taking power in 2005; the latter
served as finance minister in 2005 before winning elections in 2006 (Levitsky and
Loxton 2013). However, neither Erdoğan nor Morales or Correa had participated in
national electoral politics for more than a decade, as prescribed by Levitsky and Loxton
320to be coded as an insider. Hence, all of them can be scored as outsiders.
With regard to the type of linkage, Erdoğan is closer to Morales rather than
Fujimori or Correa. Just as the Bolivian Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), which
emerged from the autonomous coca growers’ movement (Levitsky and Loxton 2013),
the AKP was an active political party, not Erdoğan’s electoral machine (White and
325Herzog 2016). His linkage to supporters was, then, more participatory than persona-
listic, although the AKP, as the MAS, began to undergo a strong personalization of
power in the 2010s (Taş 2015).
In conclusion, in 2002 Erdoğan was a movement populist, very similar to
Morales, since both lacked a full personalistic linkage. However, he was a peculiar
330movement populist because of the partial and strategic moderation of his anti-
establishment appeal, determined by a different incentive structure respect to the
Bolivian case.
8 A. CASTALDO
Conquering the Turkish state: from a defensive to an offensive strategy
After a severe economic crisis and the collapse of the party system facilitated Erdoğan’s
335rise to power, the pattern highlighted by Levitsky and Loxton (2013) did not emerge
immediately, because of the different conditions present in Turkey respect to Latin
American cases. Due to the threat represented by tutelary institutions, which could
realistically ban the party or its leader from politics (Judiciary) or overthrow the
government (Military), Erdoğan’s main goal was survival. Hence, during his first term
340in office, instead of launching plebiscitary attacks on the old elite and its institutions of
horizontal accountability, risking to trigger an institutional crisis difficult to win,
Erdoğan adopted a defensive strategy, refraining from open conflict on religious issues,
and fostering both economic development and the EU accession process (Çarkoğlu
2007; Taş 2015; Yabanci and Taleski 2018). The core of this strategy was Erdoğan’s
345alliance with foreign forces (EU), which legitimated him internally and internationally,
allowed him to fight the establishment without resorting to dangerous plebiscitary
strategies, and shielded his government against any radical intervention by the
Kemalist state (Tocci 2005). The very same strategy, which resorted to EU-sponsored
reforms to increase the government legitimacy and to weaken internal veto-players, was
350evident in other EU candidate countries like Serbia and Macedonia (Cengiz Günay and
Dzihic 2016).
The effectiveness of this strategy was enhanced by an important facilitating condi-
tion, the partial moderation of the military elite, which was influenced by the following
factors: the lack of western support (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016); the risk of inter-
355vening directly in politics during a dire economic crisis and failing to solve it; the recent
moderate support of the military for the EU integration process and the reforms it
required, including the weakening of its tutelary powers (Gürsoy 2012).
Under the sponsorship of the EU, Erdoğan could initially pass unprecedented
reforms that weakened the military, increasing the number of civilian members in the
360National Security Council, reducing the frequency of its meetings and degrading its
decisions to simple recommendations. Moreover, the seats reserved to the military in
the Council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television Supreme Council were
taken out, and the EMASYA protocol, which allowed the military to bypass civilian
authorities in responding to social incidents, was annulled (Gürsoy 2011; Yildiz 2014).
365Hence, initially Erdoğan’s fight against the establishment improved the quality of
Turkish democracy, thanks to the EU-sponsored civilianization of politics.
After 2005, the EU accession process started to lose its dynamism, with several
European leaders objecting to Turkish membership. Consequently, the crucial source
of legitimacy and protection the EU had represented for Erdoğan quickly weakened,
370leaving the government in an environment where tutelary institutions were still power-
ful. During his first term in office, the establishment forced Erdoğan to step back from
many reforms, such as those related to the higher education system and the secondary
education, the reform of the public administration and the proposal to subject the
decisions of the Higher Military Council to civilian courts. Other examples can be
375drawn from the relationship between Erdoğan and the secularist President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer, who continuously blocked government appointments to top bureaucratic
positions and frequently vetoed important pieces of legislation (Çarkoğlu 2007).
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Such conflicts made the AKP the party in power, but not of power, putting at risk
Erdoğan’s ability to fulfil his electoral promises, and allowing him to keep at least part
380of its outsider status and the legitimacy to resort to an anti-establishment appeal. This
confrontation became critical with the 2007 presidential elections, which put Erdoğan’s
political future at risk and led to an institutional crisis similar, yet more moderate, to
those identified by Levitsky and Loxton in Latin America. These elections led Erdoğan
to unveil its populism, allowing the mechanisms highlighted by Levitsky and Loxton to
385emerge and manifest their effects. Hence, plebiscitary strategies similar to those adopted
by Morales and Correa (i.e. early elections, referenda, etc.) were used by Erdoğan to
deal with the establishment during and after this institutional crisis. The result, as in
Latin American cases, was the conquest by Erdoğan of a stronger control over crucial
state institutions, and the deployment of those institutions against opponents, which
390skewed the playing field and led to the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey.
According to formal procedures and established practices (Çarkoğlu 2007), Erdoğan
could have elected an AKP president quite easily in 2007 (Dinçşahin 2012), acquiring
full control of the last secularist bastion in the executive. Moreover, given the pre-
sidential appointment powers, the AKP could have intensified its penetration of state
395institutions (Dinçşahin 2012; Gümüşçü 2013). Finally, and more importantly, the fail-
ure to elect one of its members would not have played well in the upcoming general
elections, seriously damaging Erdoğan’s chances to win them and, hence, putting at risk
his political future (Çarkoğlu 2007).
From the opposition’s angle, an AKP president constituted a real threat, since
400a crucial republican institution would have fallen under the Islamist control. Hence,
they insisted on the selection of a secularist candidate (Çarkoğlu 2007). Erdoğan
showed no interest in finding a compromize (Çarkoğlu 2007) and selected Abdullah
Gül, whose wife wore a headscarf, as the AKP candidate (Grigoriadis 2009).
The secularist reactions were intense, triggering a dangerous institutional crisis and
405stressing what an existential threat they still represented for Erdoğan’s political future.
Pro-Kemalist media and civil society organizations objected strongly to the candidacy,
organizing crowded mass demonstration in the major cities (Grigoriadis 2009).
Moreover, on 27 April the military issued a statement, which appeared on the General
Staff’s website, known as the ‘e-coup’, criticizing the Islamist tendencies within the
410government and warning that the military stood ready to protect Kemalism (Çarkoğlu
2007; Grigoriadis 2009). Finally, the secularist Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi, CHP) appealed to the constitutional court claiming that the quorum for the
election of the president by the parliament was not reached due to its own boycott of the
presidential elections. On 1 May, with a dubious decision from a legal point of view, the
415court approved the appeal (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). At the political level, this decision showed
that the judiciary had joined the military in its opposition to Erdoğan, since it made
legally impossible the election of an AKP president (Grigoriadis 2009).
Erdoğan reacted passing on the offensive with the adoption of the strategies and
mechanisms stressed by Levitsky and Loxton. He issued a counter-statement reminding
420the military that his government represented the civilian authority and that, in democ-
racies, it is unacceptable for the armed forces to intervene in politics (Çarkoğlu 2007).
More importantly, anti-establishment discourses became dominant in Erdoğan’s rheto-
ric, with accusations to the military, the president, the CHP and the constitutional court
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to be part of ‘the elite’ as opposed to ‘the people’, represented by the AKP (Dinçşahin
4252012). Furthermore, Erdoğan proposed a constitutional amendment for direct presi-
dential elections that was later submitted to a referendum in order to override the
presidential veto. Finally, he called for an early election framing the electoral campaign
as a fight of ‘the people’ who, voting for the AKP, could defeat ‘the elite’, which was
hindering the will of the people’s rule over the country (Dinçşahin 2012). Thus, in 2007
430parliamentary elections Secularism and the nature of the regime were the dominant
issues (Grigoriadis 2009).
In these elections, the AKP passed from 34% (2002) to an astonishing 47%, giving
Erdoğan a clear electoral mandate and the popular legitimation to confront and
domesticate the establishment, in line with Levitsky and Loxton’s framework (2013).
435A step in this direction was Gül’s election to the presidency, which gave Erdoğan full
control of the executive. The victory (70%) in the 2007 referendum on direct presiden-
tial elections represented a new boost in Erdoğan’s growing confidence.
In 2008, two decisions of the constitutional court demonstrated the existential threat
constituted by the institutions of horizontal accountability for Erdoğan’s political
440survival and his capacity to fulfil his electoral promises: the lift on the headscarf ban
in universities adopted in 2007 was ruled out, and the AKP was almost banned as
a centre of anti-secular activities (Kalaycıoğlu 2012).
Starting from 2008, a series of court cases led to the unprecedented arrest of retired
generals, judges, prosecutors, journalists, businessmen, etc. According to the accusa-
445tions, they belonged to the ‘Ergenekon’ organization, which had the aim of staging
coups against the government (Gürsoy 2011; Kalaycıoğlu 2012). When Erdoğan
declared that he was the prosecutor of the Ergenekon trials, and the CHP leader,
Deniz Baykal, responded that he was the barrister for the defendants, it became clear
that the these trials had come to be part of the political fight between the AKP and the
450establishment (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). In Erdoğan’s rhetoric, these cases became evidence
for the obstruction of the national will by the elite or ‘the enemies of national
sovereignty’, as they were depicted by the AKP (Dinçşahin 2012). More importantly,
according to Esen and Gümüşçü (2016) Erdoğan used courts controlled by the
Gulenists against opponents in the armed forces through fabricated evidences and
455violations of due process, leading opposition parties, intellectuals and journalists to
denounce them as ‘political trials’, to be considered more as a tool to intimidate any
kind of AKP opponent (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016; Dinçşahin 2012; Gürsoy 2011).
The main result of these trials was a drastic delegitimation of the political role of the
military in Turkey (Taş 2015).
460Despite these trials demonstrated Erdoğan’s capacity to use the judiciary against his
opponents, this crucial secularist institution was still not under his full control. Hence,
in 2009, triggered by rumours about another closure case against the AKP (Kalaycıoğlu
2012), which again underlined the threat represented by the institutions of horizontal
accountability, Erdoğan decided to assault this crucial branch of the state administra-
465tion with a judicial reform to be submitted to a popular referendum. Only two out of 26
amendments stimulated an intense debate, since they were meant to restructure the
constitutional court and the high council of judges and public prosecutors (Hâkimler ve
Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, HSYK), enlarging their ranks and setting new selection proce-
dures (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). According to the oppositions, these amendments would put
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470the judiciary under Erdoğan’s control since the AKP could pack both organs with
loyalists.4 The amendments were voted in parliament by the AKP majority and then
submitted to a referendum. Erdoğan employed again a populist anti-establishment
appeal, which divided the society between ‘the people’ supporting the reform and ‘the
elite’ opposing it (Dinçşahin 2012). He presented the reform as a new tool to empower
475the nation and to hold secularists accountable (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). He depicted the
opposition as a ‘coalition of evil’, which could not agree on any issue except the fight
against the amendments that would make ‘the people’ stronger (Dinçşahin 2012).
On 12 September 2010, Erdoğan won the referendum (58%), gaining another crucial
electoral victory. The fears of the opposition materialized soon, since the majority of the new
480constitutional judges was conservative and the new members of the HSYK were all included
in a list unofficially circulated by the Ministry of Justice before the election (Keyman and
Gümüşçü 2014). In fact, the new HSYK relocated all the judges and prosecutors whose
decisions were not in line with the government wishes (Kalaycıoğlu 2012).
In conclusion, the processes just described sanctioned the end of tutelary democracy
485in Turkey by 2010. First under the sponsorship of the EU and through more conven-
tional tools, and then under a clearer electoral mandate and through typical populist
strategies, Erdoğan gained a greater control of crucial state institutions, including those
of the horizontal accountability, which lost to a good extant their capacity to act as
checks and balances over the executive. During its third term in office, Erdoğan
490deployed more frequently and systematically state institutions against opponents, lead-
ing to the consolidation of already emerged competitive authoritarian tendencies.
Consolidating competitive authoritarianism in Turkey
Since 2011, the maturation of Erdoğan’s populism further contributed to the consolida-
tion of the Turkish CA. Next to his anti-elite stance, which remained one of the key
495features of Erdoğan’s appeal despite the two terms in office, an anti-pluralist posture,
already (re)-emerged after 2007, further consolidated, becoming a defining character-
istic of his populism (Çinar and Sayin 2014). Hence, Erdoğan’s conception of democ-
racy returned to be almost as majoritarian and plebiscitarian as that of the WP (Çinar
and Sayin 2014; Özbudun 2006, 2014).
500As the party has grown stronger electorally, Erdoğan emphasized more and more the
support of the 50% behind him, discrediting the other 50% (Çinar and Sayin 2014). The
‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide was reconstructed drawing a sharp contrast between the ‘old
Turkey’, described as an era of coalition governments, tutelage, poverty, and corruption,
and the ‘new Turkey’, painted as the golden era of single-party governments, advanced
505democracy, wealth, and accountability (Yabanci 2016; Yabanci and Taleski 2018). All
kind of oppositions were attacked as enemies of the nation, representative of the old
Turkey, and mouthpieces of the secularist establishment (Taş 2015; Yabanci 2016).
This majoritarian and plebiscitarian approach to democracy led Erdoğan to privilege,
as instruments of accountability and source of legitimacy, direct and unmediated links
510with the people (i.e. elections, referenda, crowded mass rallies) respect to the string of
democratic checks and balances (Selçuk 2016). According to Erdoğan, the bureaucratic
oligarchy, the judiciary and the separation of powers had become impediments for the
AKP, which was the only one who could realize the people’s will (Yabanci 2016).
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This anti-pluralism was also applied to power relations within the party. In 2001, the
515AKP was basically controlled by Erdoğan, Gül and Arýnç. In the following years other
relevant figures emerged within the party, as Babacan, Davutoğlu, Şener, Coşkun, Aksu.
In the last decade, Erdoğan managed to sideline all these important AKP leaders. For
example, as President of the Republic Gül was meant to cut his ties with the party,
which he did to a considerable degree, allowing Erdoğan to purge his supporters from
520the AKP structure and exclude them from the parliament, handpicking all candidates
since the 2011 elections (Taş 2015). Moreover, in order to prevent the return of Gül to
the party as a leader, Erdoğan held an extraordinary party congress one day before the
end of Gül’s presidential mandate (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016). Thanks to these and
other strategies, like hiring numerous advisors and using some of them to control
525cabinet ministers (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016), Erdoğan was able to take full control
of the party, and, just as Morales in Bolivia, to acquire an increasingly personalistic
linkage with his supporters: the AKP became subjected to a one-man rule, with the
party cadres cleansed of alternative voices and organized according to perceived loyalty
to the leader (Taş 2015).
530The strengthening of Erdoğan’s populism further intensified the concentration of
power in his hands, as well as his unchecked control over state institutions, which were
increasingly employed against oppositions. These processes led to the consolidation of
crucial shortcomings in each of the competitive authoritarian dimensions (elections,
civil liberties, and the playing field) elaborated by Levitsky and Way (2010). In what
535follows, I underline just some key aspects, since an exhaustive analysis of these dimen-
sions can be found in Esen and Gümüşçü’s article (2016).
While elections were the least affected dimension, violations of civil liberties were
increasingly frequent and intense, as demonstrated by the declining trends of the
V-DEM Civil Liberties and Expanded Freedom of Expression indexes (Figure 2).
540As, for example, in the competitive authoritarian regime established by the Bolivian
President Morales, journalists have been heavily harassed in Erdoğan’s Turkey: between

















Figure 2. V-DEM civil liberties and freedom of expression and alternative sources of information
indexes, Turkey 2000–2017.
Source: www.v-dem.net.
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Under the 2006 law on anti-terrorism, 33 journalists were sentenced to more than
365 years in prison (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016). During Erdoğan’s third term in office,
545Turkey has become the top jailer of journalists in the world (Corke et al. 2014).
The 2013 Gezi park protest represents a major example of civil liberties violation.
Started with the aim of preserving Gezi Park against a government-sponsored project to
build in its place a reconstruction of the Taksim military barracks and a shopping mall,
the protests gained soon an anti-government orientation, which led to a brutal repres-
550sion by the police with six deaths and thousands of injured people (Amnesty
International 2013).
AQ3
�Crucial violations of the playing field dimension were also present. For example, the
access to the law was unbalanced. Erdoğan’s struggle to establish his control over the
judiciary culminated with the 2010 constitutional reform, which allowed him to pack
555the HSYK with members of the allied Gülen movement (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014).
As soon as the common enemy, the military, was sidelined the AKP–Gülen alliance
unraveled, transforming the judiciary yet again in a threat for the government: in 2013
several corruption investigations were launched against AKP ministers and even
Erdoğan’s own family. With the introduction of a new legislation in 2014 Erdoğan
560was able to close those investigations, purge the judiciary from gülenists and reaffirm
his control over this crucial institution (Müftüler-Baç 2016; Özbudun 2015).
With regard to the media access, Erdoğan enjoyed a disproportionate and biased
coverage by the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television during all the recent elec-
tions. Moreover, private media were packed or bullied by the AKP, leading to the
565consolidation of a pro-government media bloc (Yılmaz 2016).
The access to resources was also uneven. Beyond Erdoğan’s abuse of public funds in
all recent elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2015), he also used private resources to gain
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the oppositions. During the 2000s, Erdoğan used
public policy instruments to favour the emergence of politically created business actors
570through nepotistic practices in several economic sectors. In return, the favoured
entrepreneurs supported heavily the ruling party (Esen and Gümüşçü 2018; Adaman
et al.�2018Forthcoming; Buğra and Savaşkan 2014; Taş 2015).
The violations in all competitive authoritarian dimensions have been exacerbated
after the 2016 coup attempt (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017�a; Öktem and Akkoyunlu
5752016), which represented the seventh attempted military intervention in politics
since the 1950s (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017a). The coup’s failure is explained by the
lack of organization and support for the putschists and by Erdoğan’s capacity to call
on his own supporters and deploy them in his defence (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017a).
The immediate consequences were dire, with 265 people dead and more than 2.000
580injured (Schenkkan 2017). Erdoğan reacted imposing a state of emergency that
suspended the rule of law and the European Convention of Human Rights and
created the legal backdrop for comprehensive purges targeting all kinds of dissent,
including from those with not even a nominal connection to the Gülen movement,
identified by the regime as the official culprit (Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2016). After
585one year, the results were shocking: 50,546 people in jail, 103,824 dismissed from
public service and 33,843 suspended, 166 journalists in custody, hundreds of lawyers
arrested, more than $10 billion worth of private companies seized, 150 media outlets
and over 1,000 NGOs and foundations closed by decree (Schenkkan 2017). Despite
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siding unequivocally with the government, the oppositions were hit hard: for exam-
590ple, the two leaders and nine parliamentarians of the HDP were jailed, as well as an
important leader of the major opposition party, the CHP; dozens of elected mayors
in Kurdish municipalities were suspended and replaced with AKP appointees
(Öktem and Akkoyunlu 2016; Schenkkan 2017). In conclusion, the coup attempt
represented in Erdoğan’ words a ‘gift from God’ (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017a) since it
595boosted the government support and it gave to Erdoğan the opportunity to crack-
down on all kinds of dissent. On the other hand, it had dire consequences on state
effectiveness, since the purged Gülenists were substituted by far less skilled loyalists
(Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016).
Another major consequence of the 2016 coup was the opportunity seen by Erdoğan
600to adopt a constitutional reform transitioning Turkey towards ‘ultra-presidentialism’ or
‘presidential system a la turca’ (Taş�2015, 780). Being an Erdoğan’s goal at least since
2010, the post-2016 coup situation was perfect for passing this reform, due to the
unprecedented support for the government and the weaknesses of all kind of opposi-
tions. The amendments were approved by the parliament in January 2017 and sub-
605mitted to a referendum (16 April). Despite its advantage in media, money, and
resources, and the extensive powers coming from the state of emergency, Erdoğan
was barely able to win the referendum (51,41%), and perhaps thanks only to the SEC’s
decision to count votes casted on irregular ballots made the same day of the vote (Esen
and Gümüşçü 2017b; OSCE/ODIHR 2017; Schenkkan 2017). This result, widely con-
610tested at both domestic and international levels, highlights that the extensive purges
conducted during the 2016 and 2017 and the worsening economic conditions have
quickly eroded the immense support gained by Erdoğan after the coup. This decreasing
support for the regime emerged also in the snap presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions held the 24 June 2018. Erdoğan was reelected President in the first round (52.59%)
615and could maintain the majority in parliament (344 out of 600) only thanks to the
alliance with the nationalist MHP: in fact, the AKP lost 7% of the vote (42.56%) respect
to the 2015 parliamentary elections, being the only party to loose seats despite the new
parliament passed from 550 to 600 members.
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Despite all the consequences of the 2016 coup attempt had no role in explaining the
620rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey, they clearly favored its strengthening
and were, perhaps, responsible for the emergence of even more hegemonic tendencies
in the Turkish political regime (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017a, 2018).
Conclusion
The main goal of this research was to explain the rise of competitive authoritarianism in
625Turkey. I started the analysis by sharing Esen and Gümüşçü’ findings (2016) according
to which Erdoğan’s Turkey transitioned from tutelary democracy to competitive
authoritarianism since 2010. Focusing on the taxonomical debate about the type of
regime installed by Erdoğan, their study is complementary to mine since my analysis
focuses on the factors explaining this regime change.
630To explain Turkish descent into CA I applied Levitsky and Loxton’s framework
(Levitsky and Loxton 2013), according to which the election of a populist in the top
executive position represented an effective catalyst for the rise of competitive
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authoritarianism in Latin America. The analysis demonstrated the efficacy of this
framework in highlighting the processes and mechanisms leading to the rise of CA in
635Turkey. However, a set of peculiar conditions led to the emergence in the Turkish case
of a slightly different pattern respect to the one described by Levitsky and Loxton.
As for many Latin American cases, populism represented only a catalyst for the rise of
competitive authoritarianism, since several facilitating conditions and intervening factors
were present also in the Erdoğan’s case. The economic crisis and the consequent collapse of
640the Turkish party system were two of them, which contributed heavily to Erdoğan first
electoral victory in 2002. While in many Latin American cases the election of a populist
triggered a constitutional crisis almost immediately, in Turkey this crucial event was delayed.
The realistic threat represented by tutelary institutions, despite the partial moderation of the
military elite, and the opportunity represented by the EU accession process, which allowed
645Erdoğan to fight the establishment through more legitimate means, led him to repress
partially and temporarily his populist tendencies, renouncing once in power to launch
plebiscitary attacks on the old elite and its institutions of horizontal accountability. During
Erdoğan’s first term in office the establishment exerted to a good extent its veto powers,
leading to a confrontation that reached a critical point with the 2007 presidential elections,
650which triggered an institutional crisis similar to those identified by Levitsky and Loxton. Since
after 2005 the EU accession process had lost much of its dynamism, as well as the protection
and legitimacy it had initially provided to Erdoğan, in order to deal with this institutional
crisis he unveiled his populism and resorted to the populist strategies and mechanisms
highlighted by Levitsky and Loxton. The fight against the establishment led Erdoğan to use
655plebiscitary strategies similar to those adopted in many Latin American cases (anti-
establishment appeal in electoral campaigns, referenda, politicization of the judiciary, etc.),
in order to attack and colonize crucial state institutions, including those of the horizontal
accountability. In fact, as foreseen by Levitsky and Loxton’s framework, Erdoğan gained the
electoral mandate to fight and domesticate the establishment with the astonishing victory in
660the 2007 parliamentary elections, which were followed by the conquest of the presidency with
the election of an AKP president, the end of a decisive political role for the military through
the politicization of the judiciary in the Ergenekon trials, and an even more consistent
colonization of the judiciary thanks to the 2010 constitutional reform passed through
a popular referendum. At this point, the main institutions of horizontal accountability had
665lost their capacity to act as checks and balances over the executive. The colonization of these
institutions and their deployment against all kind of oppositions led to the rise of competitive
authoritarianism in Turkey.
Two main factors, which are interconnected but need to be evaluated separately for
theoretical and analytical reasons, acted as incentives and motivations for Erdoğan to
670acquire an unchecked control over state institutions and increasingly deploy them
against all oppositions. The first is clearly described in Levitsky and Loxton’s frame-
work: as in many Latin American cases, Erdoğan needed to override the veto powers of
the establishment and its institutions of horizontal accountability in order to fulfill his
electoral promises and assure his political future. Hence, on the ground of an electoral
675mandate to fight and domesticate the establishment obtained in 2007 he attempted and,
to a large extent, succeeded in removing permanently those constraints on his power,
and used those institutions against whomever could pose a similar threat in the future,
favouring in this way the emergence of competitive authoritarianism.
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The second factor emerges clearly in the Turkish case, it is to a great extent valid also
680for several Latin American cases, but it is only implicitly considered in Levitsky and
Loxton’s framework: this factor is represented by the insecurity typical of weak democ-
racies. In fact, if in consolidated democracies political competitors see each other as
adversaries, which will lose only their public positions in case of electoral defeat, in weak
democracies a game dominated by an ‘all or nothing’ logic is far more probable, in which
685political opponents consider each other as enemies and election losers may risk also their
civil liberties, political rights and even their lives. Turkey is, in this regard, a crucial case
since tutelary institutions have always represented an existential threat for Islamist parties,
which were repeatedly banned and ousted from power even in the very recent past. The
institutional crisis triggered by the 2007 presidential election, with in particular the
690‘e-coup’ attempted by the military, the almost successful attempt by the constitutional
court to ban the AKP in 2008 and the rumours that another closure case would be
opened in 2009, represented for Erdoğan further incentives to assault those institutions,
colonize them and deploy them against opponents to prevent similar threats in the future.
Moreover, Erdoğan’ violations of elections, civil liberties and the playing field made the
695option of losing power increasingly riskier since the new government could try to hold
him accountable even using the same institutions and undemocratic strategies. Hence,
this kind of insecurity complete Erdoğan’ motivations and incentives foreseen by Levitsky
and Loxton’s framework to colonize state institutions and use them to skew the playing
field, explaining in this way the rise of CA in Turkey.
700Some aspects related to the interactions between tutelary democracy and Levitsky
and Loxton’s framework need to be further highlighted, since they represent an
important contribution to this theory provided by the Turkish case. First, the existential
threat represented by tutelary institutions may convince populists to strategically
moderate their anti-establishment appeal in order to gain power; second, even once
705in power populists may decide to delay the showdown with the establishment, waiting
for more propitious conditions, without necessarily suffering a loss of popular support
as in the case of the Ecuadorian President Bucaram; third, since the establishment
includes also autonomous state institutions, populists may be able to keep at least part
of their outsider status and the capacity to resort to an anti-establishment appeal even if
710they are already in power.
The international dimension is not evaluated in Levitsky and Loxton’s framework.
However, the Turkish case shows how this factor may have a relevant impact on the
relationship between populism and the rise of competitive authoritarianism. In fact, the
EU integration process contributed to both the initial strategic moderation of Erdoğan
715and the delayed emergence of the processes foreseen by Levitsky and Loxton. It is
important to note that while fostering democracy was among the official goals of the EU
accession process, the unintended result has been to contribute to the rise of compe-
titive authoritarianism in Turkey, supporting a leader far less democratic than expected
and weakening those institutions (i.e. the military) that had prevented the emergence of
720such leaders in the past.
In conclusion, this analysis has proved that Levitsky and Loxton’s framework may
travel and explain the emergence of CAs in other regions of the world, even in cases
where the secular/religious divide represents a relevant issue. Despite the presence of
partially different conditions, which determined some differences in the ways in which
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725Levitsky and Loxton’s theory operated in the Turkish case, populism, and its interac-
tions with a set of facilitating conditions, represented an effective catalyst for the rise of
competitive authoritarianism in Turkey.
Notes
1. I adopt this definition with due respect to the many others elaborated by the literature,
730because it is directly related to my research question.
2. In 1998, Erdoğan was sentenced to 10 months in prison and banned from politics for
reciting a poem with militant Islamist tones (Selçuk 2016).
3. Cited in Yabanci (2016).
4. The constitutional reform afforded to institutions firmly under AKP control (Presidency
735and Parliament) more power to appoint senior judges and prosecutors (Taş 2015).
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